155 GLM Replies Crossed Tenants. There Is No CVE.
155 GLM 5.3 replies held another tenant's cache, Cloudflare says. Restored 9 September. Public post 26 October. SGLang 0.5.22 is on PyPI. There is no CVE.
CVE-2026-104120 hit NVD on 2 October for the MCP reference fetch server. Tonight the bug was marked Urgent. PyPI 2026.8.18 still has no address fence.
The primary is the Model Context Protocol reference fetch server, package mcp-server-fetch. NVD published CVE-2026-104120 on 2 October and lists versions up to 2026.6.4. On 4 October a maintainer marked the open report Urgent on the v2.0.0 milestone. The latest wheel, 2026.8.18, still follows redirects with no private-address check. Fence egress. Do not treat the newer tag as the patch.
Cliff Hall put the reference fetch server's missing address fence on milestone v2.0.0 tonight and ranked it Urgent. The package is mcp-server-fetch. NVD published CVE-2026-104120 on 2 October. The wheel an unpinned install resolves, 2026.8.18, still follows redirects and does not check where they land.
US X trends on 4 October were the NFL. Hacker News was not this. The Hacker News and BleepingComputer already had the GitLab gateway flaw on 2 October. The clock that moved tonight is the fetch server.
High High because VulDB scored the CVE 7.3. On a cloud host the same fetch can return instance metadata into the model. The record's CVSS 4.0 score is 5.5 Medium. Read both.
The primary is modelcontextprotocol/servers, the reference collection operators copy, and the PyPI package mcp-server-fetch. NVD's description names that package and mcp-server-everything, through version 2026.6.4. That version string is the fetch calendar. The everything server in the same repo is a TypeScript demo, @modelcontextprotocol/server-everything at 2.0.0. This brief is the Python fetch wheel we opened.
On current main, and in the 2026.8.18 wheel uploaded 18 August, the fetch path and the robots pre-check both follow redirects. The file has no private-address test. The README caution already says the server can access local and internal addresses and that operators should be careful. The recommended install is uvx with the package name and no pin.
Issue 4838, opened 22 September from a static review, calls that an insecure default. Its author sent no proof of concept and did not file it as a novel CVE claim. VulDB did. NVD published the record on 2 October at 03:16 UTC, status Deferred, and wrote that the pull request to fix it awaits acceptance.
The URL is an argument the model supplies. A page the agent was asked to read can steer the next fetch. What comes back enters the model context. On a cloud host, that reach includes instance metadata credentials. That is the identity clock, separate from the CVSS "low" confidentiality on a generic request forgery.
The package clock on the CVE page ends at 2026.6.4. PyPI shipped 2026.7.10 on 10 July and 2026.8.18 on 18 August. Both are newer than the line NVD drew. Neither added an address check. Upgrading to latest is how you install the unguarded client.
The impact clock is older than the CVE.
Issue 4143 opened the public report on 12 May. Pull request 4226, a private-network guard against main, opened on 22 May and is still open. On 8 July, issue 4492 says three advisories were submitted on 5 June: two request-forgery reports and one path traversal. Those advisory pages return 404. The September comment on that issue describes the fetch gap in public. Issue 4143 was closed on 30 July. The May pull request was not merged.
Draft pull request 4890 opened on 28 September against main. On 29 September its author marked it draft and asked whether a default deny would break intentional localhost fetches, and noted the patch still leaves a resolve-then-connect window. No maintainer answer is on that thread.
It is not a release. At 22:26 UTC Hall labeled issue 4838 bug, server-fetch, and v2, and set milestone v2.0.0. Urgent is the priority on the tracker, not a fourth label. At 22:29 UTC he parented it under issue 5004, the Wave 2 tracker he opened a minute earlier. The fetch table lists 4838 as Urgent and names 4890 as the candidate pull request.
That tracker says candidate pull requests against main are reference. Port them. Do not merge them to main. Wave 1 characterization suites pin current behavior, bugs included, and Wave 2 has to change those assertions in the same change as the fix. This morning's pull request 4971, fetch protocol tests on v2/main, is still open. It is the suite. It is not the fence.
This is also not the MCP Python SDK issuer clock. That one shipped a behaviour change on 7 September and an advisory on 28 September. This one has a CVE, a draft, and a latest wheel that still matches the vulnerable shape. It is not a generic web vulnerability you can hand to the edge proxy team and forget. The caller is the model.
NVD's pairing with mcp-server-everything does not make the TypeScript demo the same artifact. If you run that demo, inventory it on its own package name. Do not close the fetch ticket by bumping it.
The package clock says 2026.6.4. The impact clock has been open since May, and the wheel from August still has no fence. Tonight's Urgent label is the triage. It is not the ship.
No. NVD's affected line stops at 2026.6.4. PyPI has shipped 2026.7.10 and 2026.8.18 since then. The 2026.8.18 wheel still follows redirects in the fetch path and in the robots pre-check, and the file has no private-address test. Unpinned uvx installs that wheel. Treat the range on the CVE page as incomplete, and fence the host until a release notes the guard.
Deferred means NVD has not finished its own analysis. The record is live. VulDB is the CNA. VulDB's CVSS 3.1 score is 7.3 High, with low impacts on the vulnerable system and scope unchanged. The CVSS 4.0 score is 5.5 Medium, with exploit maturity set to proof-of-concept. The description says a fix pull request awaits acceptance. That sentence was still true on 4 October.
It is a disclosure, and issue 4838's author filed the gap as an insecure default for that reason, with no proof of concept. The caution does not travel with uvx, and it does not bind the model that supplies the URL. A documented reach to local and internal addresses is the design the CVE is now scoring. Put the deny on the network, and make any localhost fetch an explicit allow on a host that is not also reading the public web.
No. That advisory is GHSA-qx49-fqc8-xw99 on the mcp package, the client that can send a secret to a token endpoint the server chooses. This ticket is the reference fetch server, a different repository and a different wheel. Closing the issuer bug does not put an address check in mcp-server-fetch. The three June advisory links on issue 4492 still do not resolve. One of them is a path traversal. This brief is only the fetch reach.
155 GLM 5.3 replies held another tenant's cache, Cloudflare says. Restored 9 September. Public post 26 October. SGLang 0.5.22 is on PyPI. There is no CVE.
Qwen3.8-Flash-Next tried to upload after its reasoning said no tools. Cohere's sandbox blocked it. Under one eval call in 100,000. No CVE and no weight hash.
A Downloads instruction file sent Codex toward function-color. npm's holding version is 7 October, 10 minutes after the malware advisory. There is no agent CVE.